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ABSTRACT 
Many traditional accounts of moral development posit that children actively 
construct moral beliefs by reasoning about the distress they directly perceive in the 
aftermath of harmful or unjust actions.  However, these accounts cannot 
straightforwardly explain the development of moral beliefs about harmless but tabooed 
actions.  For cases such as these, when no negative behavioral consequences are apparent, 
top-down socialization processes (e.g., verbal instruction or “testimony” from adults) 
may instead influence moral development, as well as emotional reactions such as 
disgust.  The present research consists of four studies that empirically examine the 
mechanisms leading to the formation of moral values involving victimless actions. 
Seven-year-old children were recruited as participants in this research.  They were 
shown pictures of anthropomorphic aliens engaged in novel body-focused or 
environment-focused actions, all of which were harmless.  After being exposed to one of 
various experimental manipulations, children were asked to judge whether the depicted 
actions were “wrong” or “OK”.  It was hypothesized that participants would readily 
  viii 
acquire new moral beliefs upon being exposed to each of the experimental manipulations 
that were employed, even though none invoked suffering or harm. 
Study 1 (N = 64) found that information about unnaturalness and the invocation of 
disgust each elevated moralization, and that their independent effects were compounded 
when these manipulations were presented jointly.  Study 2 (N = 90) demonstrated that 
verbally presented testimony about disgust, but not the induced emotional experience of 
disgust, was an effective mechanism for moralization, particularly for children who were 
more disgust sensitive.  Study 3 (N = 30) found that children responded to testimony 
about anger with similar patterns of moralization as when given testimony about disgust, 
but that anger-based testimony was especially effective for children who were more 
highly prone to anger.  Study 4 (N = 28) found that children’s moral beliefs were retained 
after a prolonged time delay.  In sum, across four studies, children were found to rapidly 
form new moral beliefs about victimless actions, particularly upon exposure to 
emotionally laden testimony.  Overall, this research demonstrates that children are 
susceptible to swiftly acquiring moral beliefs even in the absence of obvious adverse 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Anthropologists who have surveyed the ethnographic literature documenting 
moral beliefs across cultures have noted both striking moral universals and striking moral 
disagreements.  While there is strong consensus across societies that actions involving 
killing, resource distribution, sex, and eating should be proscribed or regulated (Brown, 
1991), there are a multitude of divergent beliefs surrounding specific issues such as 
whether women should work and how modestly they should dress, how criminals should 
be punished, and what marriage practices are acceptable (Shweder, 1994).  In recent 
years, a great deal of progress has been made in explaining the underlying psychology 
that may account for this pattern of constrained diversity in adulthood (e.g., Cushman, 
2013; Graham et al., 2013; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2012; 
Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012; Nichols, 2004), as well as in 
uncovering precocious precursors of these moral beliefs in infancy (Baillargeon et al., 
2014; Bloom, 2013; Hamlin, 2013).  However, the developmental processes by which the 
beliefs underlying cultural universals and differences are initially formed in individual 
minds during childhood remain largely unknown.  The present research investigates some 
possible mechanisms that lead children to acquire new moral beliefs. 
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The Moral Significance of Victimless Actions 
In order to begin investigating various processes involved in moral development, 
it is useful to first discuss the scope of “morality”.  In the current research, it will be taken 
for granted that the moral domain descriptively encompasses a diverse plurality of 
concerns and cannot be straightforwardly unified by its content (Graham et al., 2013; 
Greene, 2015; Haidt, 2012; Prinz, 2007; Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2014; Stich, 
2006).  Definitions that aim to operationalize morality according to function – perhaps, a 
system of norms that fosters social cohesion – or according to form – perhaps, deontic 
judgments of third-party obligation – are more promising than definitions that attempt to 
unify morality according to its substance.  However, even these definitions are subject to 
numerous counterexamples (Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2014).  A satisfyingly 
encompassing definition is likely unattainable, as morality is not a natural kind but rather 
a nebulous concept that cannot be clearly circumscribed (see McKay & Whitehouse, 
2015; Strohminger, 2014). 
Therefore, although the moral domain is sometimes described as exclusively 
involving concerns about harm (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; Gray & Wegner, 2012; 
Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009), injustice (Kohlberg, 1971; Sousa, Holbrook, & 
Piazza, 2009; Sousa & Piazza, 2014), or both (Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 2006), these 
delineations omit much of what is typically viewed as being morally relevant.  Indeed, 
research has demonstrated that a significant proportion of folk moral concerns take the 
form of sacred values that are considered inviolable regardless of clear consequences for 
the wellbeing of others (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; 
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Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, Koller, & 
Dias, 1993; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 
1997; Tetlock, 2003).   
The harmless acts that are considered by some to be moral transgressions (e.g., 
polytheism, homosexuality, obscenity, stem cell research, birth control) represent the root 
of the “culture wars” that have sparked violent disagreements across ideological divides 
both intra-nationally and internationally (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Jensen, 
1998; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).  Furthermore, considering these 
victimless actions to be repugnant can exert major constraints on economic markets, 
sometimes precluding transactions from being conducted despite beneficial outcomes and 
willing suppliers (Roth, 2007).  Given these tangible impacts in adulthood, it is important 
to understand how young children acquire moral values in the absence of utilitarian 
considerations about protecting the welfare of third parties. 
Despite the theoretical and societal significance of understanding the mechanisms 
that enable the initial acquisition of particular moral values, this process of moralization 
has not received much attention from psychological scientists (Bloom, 2010).  The 
reasons for this are largely historical; rather than studying the enculturation of new moral 
ideas, most cognitive-developmental approaches to moral psychology have attempted to 
uncover the structure of emerging moral thought in general.  This focus is rooted in the 
assumption that moral development is a rational endeavor that relies on progressive 
advances in domain-general cognitive abilities and universalizable principles that 
children deduce through perspective taking.  This widely held notion of moral 
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ontogenesis arose under the influence of Western philosophy – particularly Kantian 
ethics – and by Jean Piaget’s formative research on the topic.  In particular, it is often 
assumed that children construct moral concepts by actively making sense of social 
interactions that involve perpetrating harm to third parties (Killen & Smetana, in press; 
Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983).  As a result, psychologists interested in the development of 
moral judgments have typically focused on the facilitative role of witnessing distressed 
victims. 
 
The Limited Role of Witnessing Distress in Moral Development 
In part due to the common characterization of the moral domain as involving 
considerations about welfare and fairness, a common viewpoint in research on moral 
development is that moral evaluations are formulated upon observing distress in the 
aftermath of certain actions (e.g., Blair, 1995).  Certain actions (such as hitting) are 
inherently linked to injury and pain, and the empathy that children spontaneously feel in 
the wake of repeatedly witnessing and experiencing the negative consequences of these 
actions plausibly lead them to assign moral significance to such actions (Smetana, 2006; 
Turiel, 1983).  Empirical evidence has shown that young children judge unfamiliar acts to 
be immoral upon discovering that they cause pain or distress (Smetana, 1985; Zelazo, 
Helwig, & Lau, 1996).   
However, although these studies demonstrate that children can use distress as an 
indicative cue of moral wrongness, there are important exceptions indicating that this is 
neither necessary nor sufficient; children sometimes exhibit moral concern in the absence 
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of distress and do not always believe that moral concern is warranted in the presence of 
distress cues (see Heiphetz & Young, 2014).  In particular, young children do not 
reflexively sympathize with distressed others, or demonstrate concern whenever they 
perceive apparent harm, but rather require knowledge that distress is justified such that a 
boy is not merely crying wolf (e.g., Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013; Leslie, Mallon, 
& DiCorcia, 2006).  Additionally, children do not judge harmful actions differently when 
they are done to victims who cannot feel pain (e.g., Superman) compared to “crybabies” 
who sensitively react even to non-painful stimuli (Weisberg & Leslie, 2012).  Even 18-
month-old infants understand that distress does not warrant a moral judgment in the 
absence of a justified cause for this distress; they show concern for a sad adult only when 
this adult has just experienced a negatively valenced event (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 
2013).  Eighteen-month-olds also demonstrate sympathetic concern in situations where 
somebody has been harmed but does not show any emotional signals of distress (Vaish, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009).  This evidence suggests that the qualities of an action are 
often more morally relevant than its associated reaction, which can be exaggerated or 
suppressed.   
Additionally, research with adults has confirmed that people frequently develop 
moral aversions to actions independently of aversions to their actual or potential 
outcomes (see Miller & Cushman, 2013).  People experience stress responses upon 
performing prototypically harmful actions (e.g., pulling the trigger of a gun) even when 
they have full knowledge that no harm will be caused (e.g., the gun is a toy without 
bullets; Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012), and this aversion to harmful actions is 
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a strong predictor of moral judgments even when controlling for aversion toward the 
suffering that is typically caused by these actions (Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 
2014). 
On the whole, this inconsistent link between distress and moral judgments 
suggests that moral concepts are not wholly acquired from assessments of harmful 
consequences.  This suggests that a constructivist approach that emphasizes children’s 
autodidactic attention to negative outcomes may not always be able to account for 
children’s moral acquisition (Rottman & Young, 2015).  Although this is likely to be true 
in the case of certain harmful or unjust actions, an examination of the processes involved 
in children’s moralization of harmless actions provides the most unambiguous test of this 
hypothesis.  In particular, because there are no negative consequences similar to distress 
that suggest the seemingly arbitrary moral status that is frequently ascribed to a range of 
religious taboos, purity-based transgressions, and other sacred values (e.g., eating 
particular kinds of meat, kissing particular kinds of people), children would presumably 
be unable to construct moral beliefs about these innocuous actions if left fully to their 
own devices (Edwards, 1987; Haidt, 2012; Rottman & Kelemen, 2012).  Particularly for 
these kinds of victimless moral violations, verbal instruction from adults, as well as 
emotional reactions such as disgust, may heavily influence moral development.  The 
present research empirically examines the role of both of these factors in detail. 
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The Role of Testimony in Moral Acquisition 
 
Because of the frequent assertion that firsthand experiences and perspective 
taking are the primary mechanisms driving children’s advancement toward mature moral 
competence (e.g., Killen & Smetana, in press; Kohlberg, 1971; Turiel, 1983), or the more 
recent focus on early-emerging moral competence in childhood (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 
2014; Bloom, 2013; Hamlin, 2013), the role of socially transmitted verbal assertions by 
others (i.e., “testimony”) in moral development has generally been discounted.  Even 
when the relevance of testimony is acknowledged, it is often consigned to being merely 
one among many environmental influences that children may or may not take into 
consideration when reflecting on the moral qualities of a given situation (Grusec & 
Goodnow, 1994; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1989, 1999; Turiel, 1983).  However, it 
is possible that testimony plays a more central causal role in children’s moral acquisition. 
There are several a priori reasons to predict a strong role of testimony in moral 
development.  For instance, cultural diversity in moral beliefs could be explained at least 
in part by differing informational content provided to children in different societies.  
Additionally, acquiring information through firsthand experience is frequently time-
consuming, often costly, and sometimes impossible.  Humans have recurrently 
circumvented this adaptive problem by deriving knowledge from listening to other 
people.  In general, learning from testimony is a major source of conceptual development 
and knowledge acquisition throughout childhood (see Gelman, 2009; Harris, 2012; Harris 
& Koenig, 2006; Mills, 2013; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013).  This pertains across a wide range 
of domains, including understanding gravity and physical causality (Bascandziev & 
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Harris, 2010; Jaswal, 2010; Klahr & Nigam, 2004), selecting what foods to eat (Lumeng, 
Cardinal, Jankowski, Kaciroti, & Gelman, 2008; Shutts, Kinzler, & DeJesus, 2013), and 
forming ontological beliefs about the reality status of unobservable and counterintuitive 
biological and religious entities (Canfield & Ganea, 2014; Harris, Pasquini, Duke, 
Asscher, & Pons, 2006; Lane, Harris, Gelman, & Wellman, 2014).  It is therefore 
plausible that children may additionally acquire many moral values from testimony 
(Edwards, 1987; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Harris, 2012; Nichols, 2004; Rottman & Young, 
2015; Shweder et al., 1987; Sripada & Stich, 2006).  
Notably, the forms of testimony that children typically receive about moral values 
are markedly different from typical forms of testimony in epistemic domains.  For 
instance, they include fewer appeals to evidence (Luce, Callanan, & Smilovic, 2013).  
Additionally, effective moral testimony may often involve appeals to emotions; children 
identify as children identify emotionally sensitive people as being better at solving moral 
dilemmas than highly knowledgeable people (Danovitch & Keil, 2007, 2008).  This 
evidence hints that emotions may play a privileged role in moral cognition – a conclusion 
that has been bolstered by a recent explosion of literature within social psychology. 
 
The Role of Emotion in Moral Acquisition 
Since the Enlightenment, the question of whether moral judgments stem primarily 
from reasoning processes (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Royzman, Goodwin, & Leeman, 2011; 
Turiel, 1983) or primarily from emotional processes (e.g., de Waal, 1996; Frank, 1988; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt et al., 1993; Prinz, 2007; Young & Koenigs, 2007) has been 
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heavily disputed.  While most contemporary scholars admit that a simple dichotomous 
resolution to this debate will never be achieved (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Decety & Howard, 
2014; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007), there is still room to characterize precisely how 
these “cool” and “hot” components of cognition contribute to the formation of moral 
judgments.  Indeed, resolutions to many meta-ethical debates hinge on the answer to this 
question (e.g., Greene, 2013; Joyce, 2006).  To date, nearly all of the empirical work on 
this topic has focused on mature moral competence in adulthood. 
While some research has been conducted to investigate the role of reasoning in 
moral judgments – for example, by providing adult participants with more time or 
cognitive resources with which to deliberate about their moral evaluations (e.g., Paxton, 
Ungar, & Greene, 2012) – the lion’s share of the recent surge of research addressing this 
debate has aimed to investigate the importance of emotions.  In particular, much research 
has centered on the emotion of disgust (see Olatunji & Puncochar, 2014).  Although 
disgust is often thought to be primarily adapted for policing the boundaries of the 
physical body in order to motivate pathogen avoidance (Chapman & Anderson, 2012; 
Curtis, de Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Kelly, 2011; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Rozin, 
Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; Schaller & Park, 2011; Stevenson, Case, & Oaten, 2009; 
Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013), there are also reasons to believe that 
biological and/or cultural evolution has led this emotion to become functionally adapted 
for socio-moral condemnation and ostracism of social deviants (Chapman & Anderson, 
2013; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Rottman, 
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2014; Rottman & Young, 2014; Rozin & Haidt, 2013; Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009; 
Tybur et al., 2013). 
 Sensitivity to disgust elicitors, such as feces and cockroaches, has been proposed 
as a stable personality characteristic in adults (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Olatunji 
et al., 2007).  Research from several laboratories has found that individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity are reliably related to individual differences in morally relevant 
judgments.  For example, high levels of trait disgust are correlated with more negative 
implicit associations with homosexual behavior and higher intentionality ratings of 
homosexual behavior, which (due to a reliable link between moral judgments and 
intentionality judgments; Knobe, 2003) can be interpreted as an implicit measure of 
moral condemnation (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009).  Additionally, disgust 
sensitivity is positively associated with unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and 
foreigners (Hodson & Costello, 2007; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006), political conservatism 
(Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012), and conservative positions on various political 
issues such as abortion and gay marriage (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Terrizzi, 
Shook, & Ventis, 2010).  
Although the existence of a correlational relationship between emotional 
sensitivity and moral evaluations is suggestive of the importance of emotions for moral 
judgment, it leaves room for debate about whether emotions typically precede or follow 
moral judgment (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009).  Experimental designs have been 
used to draw stronger conclusions about the role that emotional responses can play in 
causally producing – and perhaps even fully constituting – moral judgments.  Several 
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influential studies have found evidence that experimentally inducing particular emotional 
states can casually impact moral judgments (e.g., Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).  In particular, inductions of 
disgust have been repeatedly found to elevate levels of moral condemnation – whether 
the disgust is induced through a noxious odor (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008), 
disgusting video footage (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Schnall et al., 2008; 
Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012), hypnosis (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), gustatory 
sensations of bitterness (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011), or the sounds of vomiting 
(Seidel & Prinz, 2013).  However, as will be further discussed in Chapter 6, there have 
recently been repeated failures to replicate these effects (Landy & Goodwin, in press). 
Even if continued research conclusively demonstrates that disgust can indeed 
causally amplify moral condemnation, this does not necessarily speak to whether disgust 
is a moralizing emotion – that is, whether it can lead to the formation of a value where 
one did not previously exist.  In other words, it is possible that disgust can elevate 
judgments about pre-existing moral beliefs while lacking the power to imbue a previously 
permissible or amoral action with moral significance (Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011).  
Therefore, even if emotions play a role in forming everyday moral judgments and in 
intensifying moral evaluations in experimental settings, they may not be sufficient to 
cause moral change (Bloom, 2010).  
Although there is currently little evidence that disgust is a moralizing emotion 
(Pizarro et al., 2011; but see Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), this particular emotion is often 
identified as a plausibly powerful factor in the process of moralization (Rozin, 1999).  
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For example, disgust is associated with the moralization of cigarette smoking (Rozin & 
Singh, 1999) and meat-eating (Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997).  It is possible, 
therefore, that people begin to treat smoking and vegetarianism as moral issues upon 
hearing how gross and repulsive it is to inhale tobacco or to eat animals.  However, some 
evidence suggests that feelings of disgust may be generally a consequence rather than a 
cause of moral change (Fessler, Arguello, Mekdara, & Macias, 2003) – a hypothesis that 
is best tested through a developmental investigation of children’s initial acquisition of 
moral beliefs. 
 
Overview of the Present Research 
Ever since Piaget’s (1932) seminal studies on children’s moral evaluations, 
research in moral development has generally focused on children’s autodidactic 
construction of harm-based and justice-based moral norms.  Because of this, almost 
nothing is known about how victimless or arbitrary moral norms are acquired.  The 
present research begins filling in this gap in the literature by asking the question: In the 
absence of harmful consequences, what does it take to convince a child that a seemingly 
innocuous behavior is in fact immoral?  As suggested by the literature reviewed above, 
moral development may rely more on verbal communication and condemnatory emotions 
like disgust to a much greater extent than cognitive developmentalists have generally 
believed. 
Four studies will be presented in this dissertation.  Study 1 serves as a preliminary 
investigation into potential mechanisms contributing to children’s rapid acquisition of 
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moral beliefs about arbitrary, harmless actions.  Specifically, it examines the independent 
and joint roles of information about unnaturalness and disgust to explore theoretical 
claims about the relevance of norms and feelings in moral acquisition.  Study 2 pursues 
this initial finding by investigating whether testimony or induced emotional experience is 
a more effective mechanism for moralization.  This is accomplished by teasing apart the 
independent influences of a direct disgust elicitor (i.e., a noxious smell) and testimony 
about disgust, which are confounded in Study 1.  Study 3 investigates whether children 
respond to testimony about anger with different patterns of moralization than with 
testimony about disgust in order to help resolve whether or not disgust has a privileged, 
domain-specific relationship with victimless actions.  Study 4 investigates the potency of 
a variety of additional forms of testimony that more closely match the justifications that 
children typically provided in Studies 2 and 3.  Additionally, participants in this final 
study were invited back for a second session after a lengthy delay, which allows for a test 
of whether their learned beliefs persist over time and generalize to a setting in which they 
are tested by a different experimenter. 
In order to gain precise insight into the mechanisms leading to the formation of 
moral values involving victimless actions, all of the studies in this dissertation 
exclusively involve 7-year-old children.  This choice is justified by three primary reasons.  
First, children were tested rather than adults because it is likely that many moral beliefs 
are acquired during childhood (see Kagan & Lamb, 1987).  As relative moral naïfs with 
comparatively malleable beliefs, children offer a unique window into how new behaviors 
become initially moralized.  In contrast to adults, their reactions to novel situations are 
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less likely to be contaminated by deeply entrenched moral preconceptions, analogies to 
prior experience, or other heuristics.  Second, social learning that leads to cultural 
differences in moral beliefs may become especially pronounced around 7 years of age 
(House et al., 2013).  Third, although little is known about the development of disgust 
(see Rottman, 2014), there is some evidence that disgust toward socio-moral elicitors 
may not emerge until 7 years of age (Stevenson, Oaten, Case, Repacholi, & Wagland, 
2010).  Because moral disgust was a primary focus of this research, 7-year-olds 
constituted an ideal age group. 
An empirical exploration of the roles of testimony and emotions in the 
moralization of victimless actions is relevant to theoretical accounts of cognitive 
development and moral psychology.  In addition, this research has the potential to help 
the broader public understand how so many moral dilemmas and disagreements come to 
exist.  For instance, investigating the initial origins of moral beliefs in childhood will 
shed light on questions about how adults come to possess strong moral convictions about 
significant issues such as whether marriage should only be between a man and a woman 
or whether “fracking” should be prohibited.  Thus, uncovering knowledge about moral 
competence has both scientific and societal significance.  
  
15 
CHAPTER 2 
NORMS AND FEELINGS IN THE MORALIZATION OF VICTIMLESS ACTS 
(STUDY 1) 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
In order to examine a clear-cut case of moralization, this research involves 
morally naïve subjects (i.e., children) and entirely novel and superficially blameless 
situations.  To my knowledge, this study is the first experimental investigation of whether 
children are able to rapidly acquire arbitrary moral beliefs after a very brief exposure to 
sparse information about harmless behaviors. 
There are two pathways that have been repeatedly cited as reasonable candidates 
for the moralization of victimless moral concerns: 1) gaining information that a behavior 
is unnatural (Chakroff & Young, 2015; Jarudi, 2009; Rozin et al., 2004; Sullivan-Blum, 
2006) and 2) feeling that a behavior is disgusting (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 
2009; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Seidel & Prinz, 2013).  Study 1 investigates 
whether children’s acquisition of new moral beliefs can be produced by disgust or by 
testimony about naturalness, and whether the combination of these factors yields any 
additional influence on the moralization process.  In particular, Study 1 examines the 
plausibility of a two-factor model of moralization in which two dissociable components 
(i.e., unnaturalness and disgust) can both substantially contribute to moral acquisition, 
such that morals are most readily acquired when both “norms” and “feelings” are 
involved (Kagan, 1984; Nichols, 2004).  Do disgust and information about unnaturalness 
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work in concert rather than being redundant pathways, such that their combination is 
more powerful than either factor alone?   
 
Participants 
Study 1 enrolled 64 participants (16 per condition, which is standard for many 
studies of cognitive development).  All participants were seven years of age (Mage = 7 
years, 4.4 months, SD = 3.4 months).  They were recruited from a large participant 
database and tested in the Boston University Child Cognition Lab.  Participants in this 
database are primarily European-American, upper-middle-class children living in the 
Boston area.  Equal numbers of males and females were assigned to each condition. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
In order to familiarize participants with the basic procedure, they received a 
warm-up session involving three warm-up questions: they were asked whether it is wrong 
or OK to steal candy, whether it is wrong or OK to pet a cat, and whether it is wrong or 
OK to wear a backpack on one’s front.  They were then introduced to the faraway planet 
“Glinhondo” and shown a series of 12 color drawings (see Appendix).  Each drawing 
depicted a group of anthropomorphic aliens engaged in an unfamiliar and superficially 
mild activity.  Half of these behaviors were body-focused (i.e., covering their heads with 
sticks; putting crunchy bits in their food; drinking out of straws instead of using their 
spoon hands; painting their faces white; keeping berries on their protective spines; 
walking around with fake legs) and half were environment-focused (i.e., filling the forest 
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with cotton balls; pouring river water on flowers to make them big and square; sprinkling 
blue water into the big puddle; blocking the river to make it flow in a different direction; 
taking trees from other planets and planting them on Glinhondo; building machines to 
make the air more misty).  In total, there were three distinct groups of aliens, each of 
which was depicted for two body-focused actions and two environment-focused actions.  
These scenarios were presented in random order, and each drawing was accompanied by 
a short description, which was read aloud by the experimenter (the author).  All 
descriptions introduced the behavior and then provided two statements about it.  After 
listening to these brief descriptions, participants were asked to judge whether they 
thought it was “wrong” or “OK”1 for the aliens to engage in the action in question.  
In order to tease apart the relative contributions of unnaturalness and disgust in 
the acquisition of victimless moral norms, participants were assigned to one of four 
conditions, which varied the content of the information provided about each behavior.  
Although the content of these descriptions varied across conditions, the amount of 
information that was provided and the prosody and tone with which the descriptions were 
read was kept constant.  The conditions were characterized as follows. 
Disgust Only Condition: Visceral feelings of disgust were induced by testing 
children in a room that contained a wastebasket with spray from a harmless but potent 
gag product (“Liquid ASS”), as inspired by Schnall and colleagues (2008).  In addition to 
the strong ambient gastrointestinal smell, this product was also sprayed into a small box 
                                                
1  Several additional questions were also asked in Study 1.  However, the findings were 
largely redundant with those presented here and so are not described.  Details are 
available from the author upon request. 
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that participants sniffed at the beginning of the study, being told “this is what Glinhondo 
smells like” in order to conceal the unusual nature of the request.  Many children were 
visibly disgusted by this manipulation and, upon later questioning at the end of the study, 
reported feeling disgusted during the experimental session.  In addition to the induction 
of visceral disgust, participants listened to a statement characterizing the behavior as 
disgusting before judging each of the alien behaviors as either “wrong” or “OK” (words 
in brackets are specific to one trial): “Look at this!  All [Kulvaws] [paint their faces 
white].  But it’s really disgusting for [Kulvaws] to [paint their faces white].  Acting like 
this is really gross.”  
 Unnatural Only Condition: Participants were tested in a room that did not contain 
the disgusting smell.  The pictures were altered so that exactly half of the aliens depicted 
were performing the behavior, while the other half were shown doing nothing.  This was 
done so that the behaviors did not appear to be normative conventions.  Instead of hearing 
that each behavior was disgusting and gross, participants were told the following: “Look 
at this!  Some [Kulvaws] [paint their faces white].  But [Kulvaws] were never meant to 
[paint their faces white].  Acting like this is really unnatural.”  
 Disgust + Unnatural Condition: Elements of both the Disgust Only condition and 
the Unnatural Only condition were combined, and nothing additional was added.  In 
order to both induce visceral disgust and provide information about unnaturalness, the 
disgusting smell was used in combination with the pictures from the Unnatural Only 
condition.  Participants listened to the following statement, which contained only one of 
the two crucial sentences from each of the previous conditions such that overall length 
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was matched: “Look at this!  Some [Kulvaws] [paint their faces white].  But [Kulvaws] 
were never meant to [paint their faces white].  Acting like this is really gross.”  
Control Condition: This condition provided a baseline measure of responding.  In 
this condition, children heard information that, while negative in valence, was not 
morally relevant.  The gag product was not used, and the pictures depicted all aliens 
engaged in each behavior, as in the Disgust Only condition.  Participants listened to the 
following: “Look at this! All [Kulvaws] [paint their faces white].  But [Kulvaws] 
sometimes get tired of [painting their faces white] and do something else instead.  Acting 
like this is really boring.” 
 
Results 
 Participants received 1 point for a “wrong” response and 0 points for an “OK” 
response.  Points were summed across the twelve trials, yielding a scale ranging from 0 to 
12.  Descriptive statistics collapsed across condition demonstrated that the overall 
average number of wrongness judgments was 5.27 out of 12 (SD = 3.43).  Condition 
means and standard errors are presented in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1.  Percentage of items judged as “wrong” in each condition in Study 1.  Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
Differences between conditions were analyzed with analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and t-tests.2  A 2 (Disgust: present vs. absent) x 2 (Unnaturalness: present vs. 
absent) x 2 (Trial Type: body vs. environment) ANOVA was conducted on children’s 
“wrong” responses.  This analysis yielded a main effect of the disgust manipulation, F(1, 
60) = 8.58, p < .01, η2p = .13, a main effect of normative information, F(1, 60) = 12.30, p 
= .001, η2p = .17, and no interaction between these factors, F(1, 60) = 0.02, p = .90, η2p = 
.00.  The ANOVA also revealed a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 60) = 31.68, p < 
                                                
2 Although the responses were dichotomous, thus violating a fundamental assumption of 
parametric statistics (namely, that dependent variables should be continuous), statisticians 
have previously demonstrated that the ANOVA is robust for this violation given a large 
enough sample size and equal numbers of observations in each cell (Lunney, 1970).  For 
this reason, we followed a precedent set by other studies of moral development of using 
ANOVA to analyze dichotomous data (e.g., Smetana, Tasopoulos-Chan, Gettman, 
Villalobos, Campione-Barr, & Metzger, 2009; Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001).  
Additionally, similar results were obtained when these data were analyzed using 
hierarchical linear mixed-effect models. 
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.001, η2p = .35, with ratings of wrongness being more frequent for environment-related 
items (M = 54%) than body-related items (M = 34%).  There were no two- or three-way 
interactions with Disgust or Unnaturalness (ps > .70), demonstrating that this effect 
remained constant regardless of the between-subjects manipulations. 
In order to more directly compare each of the four conditions that resulted from 
the 2 (Disgust) x 2 (Unnaturalness) design, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the effect of Condition on participants’ “wrong” responses. This was significant, 
F(3, 63) = 6.97, p < .001, η2p = .26.  Planned post-hoc analyses demonstrated that 
children were more likely to judge the aliens’ actions as wrong in the Disgust + 
Unnatural condition than in either the Disgust Only (p < .05) or Unnatural Only (p = .05) 
conditions.  Responses in these latter two conditions did not differ from each other (p = 
.68).  Finally, all three of these conditions yielded significantly more “wrong” judgments 
than the control condition (ps < .05).   
 
Discussion 
This study yielded the striking finding that children are able to acquire novel 
moral beliefs after a very brief exposure to sparse information about superficially 
blameless behaviors. Children in the Disgust + Unnatural condition judged behaviors to 
be wrong 65% of the time, compared to only 19% of the time in the Control condition.  In 
sum, moral acquisition can occur rapidly, provided the relevant forms of information are 
present in the input that a child receives.  
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These findings tentatively lend support to a two-factor model of moralization in 
which two dissociable components (unnaturalness and disgust) can both substantially 
contribute to moral acquisition.  Importantly, these factors are strongest when in 
combination, such that morals are most readily acquired when both are involved.  It was 
only in the joint presentation (Disgust + Unnatural) condition that children formed moral 
beliefs at above-chance levels, reliably judging actions to be immoral rather than 
permissible.  These data demonstrate that, rather than being redundant, unnaturalness and 
disgust more powerfully lead to moral acquisition when combined. 
The current results also refine an understanding of the extent to which each of 
these factors can produce moral judgment in isolation and the manner in which they 
interface when together.  Relative to a baseline control condition, the invocation of 
disgust and information about unnaturalness each independently produced a significant 
increase in judgments of moral wrongness.  Additionally, statistical exploration of joint 
effects revealed that it was the combination and not the interaction of these factors that 
produced an additional elevation in moralization; the effects of each of the factors were 
additive, not multiplicative.  In short, while morals were most robustly acquired by 
children in a context involving “norms with feeling,” these results run contrary to a 
strong proposal that moral acquisition should only occur when both affective and 
cognitive processing are engaged (Nichols, 2004). 
However, because the Disgust Only condition involved both an induction of the 
visceral experience of disgust (via the noxious smell) and testimony about disgust (via 
information that the actions were disgusting), it is unclear whether this manipulation was 
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truly impacting children’s feelings rather than conveying new emotionally-relevant 
information through testimony.  Study 2 was designed to disambiguate these two factors.    
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CHAPTER 3 
MORALIZATION BASED ON TESTIMONY ABOUT DISGUST  
VS. DIRECT INDUCTIONS OF DISGUST (STUDY 2) 
 
Aims and Hypotheses  
Study 2 was designed to investigate the relative importance of direct emotional 
experience and verbally communicated information by testing the independent influence 
of the noxious smell and the disgust testimony that were combined in the Disgust Only 
condition in Study 1.  This study also compared the results of these two conditions to a 
new control condition, which was conducted in order to ensure the reliability of the 
control condition from Study 1.  In addition, this study investigated the moral relevance 
of both state disgust (the transient feeling induced by the spray) and trait disgust (the 
dispositional tendency to experience the emotion of disgust across different contexts). 
 
Participants 
Study 2 enrolled 90 participants (45 of each gender, 30 per condition; Mage = 7 
years, 5.5 months, SD = 3.8 months), who were recruited in the same fashion as in Study 
1.  This increased sample size was determined by a post hoc power analysis conducted on 
the effect of the Disgust Only condition compared to the Control condition in the previous 
study, which indicated that the relevant finding from Study 1 was underpowered (d = 
0.76; power = .55), and which indicated that at least 29 participants per condition would 
be needed to provide adequate power (.80) in subsequent research.   
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Materials and Procedure 
The stimuli and general procedure were identical to that of Study 1.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the following three conditions.  Again, all conditions 
involved equal numbers of males and females. 
 Induced Disgust Condition: Visceral feelings of disgust were induced by testing 
children in a room filled with the spray used in Study 1.  This product was again sprayed 
into a small box that participants sniffed at the beginning of the study, being told “this is 
what Glinhondo smells like” in order to conceal the unusual nature of the request.  
Participants were presented with each action in turn (e.g., “Look at this!  All Kulvaws 
paint their faces white”) and were asked to judge the behavior as “wrong” or “OK” 
without any further testimony. 
Disgust Testimony Condition: Participants listened to the following description 
before judging the behavior as either “wrong” or “OK” (words in brackets are specific to 
one trial): “Look at this! All [Kulvaws] [paint their faces white].  But it’s really 
disgusting for [Kulvaws] to [paint their faces white].  Acting like this is really gross.”  
The smell was not present in the testing room. 
Control Condition: Participants were presented with each action (e.g., “Look at 
this!  All Kulvaws paint their faces white”) and were asked to judge the behavior as 
“wrong” or “OK” without any further testimony. 
In order to investigate the relationship of moralization and dispositional 
tendencies to experience disgust, the contribution of individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity was also investigated by administering a brief Trait Disgust measure after 
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participants responded to all 12 scenarios.  This was the first time that individual 
differences in dispositional sensitivity to disgust has been measured in children, and thus 
the measure was adapted from a previously existing adult questionnaire: the 32-item 
Disgust Scale (Haidt et al., 1994).  In particular, the present measure involved Likert-
scale ratings of four items that were especially child-friendly, as listed in Table 1.  
Finally, at the conclusion of the study session, the drawings were again presented one by 
one, and participants were asked to explain why they had previously said that each of the 
12 actions were “wrong” or “OK”.  This was done in order to determine the extent to 
which the participants appeared to have conscious introspective access into the sources of 
their moral judgments.  Data from this justification task will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Table 1.  Trait disgust measure.  Items were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from “not at all / definitely not” to “a lot / yes, definitely”. 
 
Do you think that you would ever try eating monkey meat?  
If you saw a cockroach in somebody else’s house, how much would that bother you?  
If you were really hungry and someone gave you a bowl of your favorite soup, but it 
had been stirred by a fly swatter, would you drink it? 
If one of your friends gave you a piece of chocolate that was shaped like dog doo, 
would you eat it?  
 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics collapsed across condition demonstrated that the overall 
average number of wrongness judgments was 3.70 out of 12 (SD = 2.89).  (See Fig. 2 for 
condition means).  A Trait Disgust score was computed by summing each participant’s 
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ratings of the four administered items, reverse scoring where appropriate such that higher 
scores indicated higher disgust sensitivity.  This yielded a scale ranging from 4 to 20.  
Overall, the mean was 14.81 (SD = 3.23).  However, in contrast to the high (> .80) 
Cronbach’s Alphas previously found for the full 32-item scale with adults (Haidt et al., 
1994), this scale demonstrated very low internal reliability among children (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .39).   
 
 
Fig. 2.  Percentage of items judged as “wrong” in each condition in Study 2.  Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA, conducted to test the effect of Condition on participants’ 
“wrong” judgments, revealed a marginally significant effect, F(2, 87) = 2.96, p = .057, 
η2p = .064.  Planned t-tests demonstrated that the Induced Disgust condition was not 
significantly different from either the Control condition, t(52.6) = 1.64, p = .107, d = 0.42 
(95% CI: -0.23, 2.30), or the Disgust Testimony condition, t(58) = -0.90, p = .372, d = -
0.23 (95% CI: -2.37, 0.90).  However, there was a significantly greater proportion of 
“wrong” judgments in the Disgust Testimony condition than in the Control condition, 
t(46.5) = 2.41, p = .020, d = 0.62 (95% CI: 0.29, 3.24). 
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A one-way ANOVA was additionally conducted on participants’ first judgment, 
to control for potential order effects, repetition of the testimony, and habituation to the 
smell.  This was significant, F(2, 87) = 7.64, p = .001, η2p = .149.  Planned t-tests 
demonstrated that the Induced Disgust condition did not differ from the Control 
condition, t(47.41) = 1.03, p = .310, d = 0.28 (95% CI: -0.77, 2.36), whereas there were 
significantly more “wrong” judgments in the Disgust Testimony condition than in both 
the Control condition, t(36.90) = 3.49, p = .001, d = 0.92 (95% CI: 1.68, 6.32), and the 
Induced Disgust condition, t(48.54) = 2.53, p = .015, d = 0.66 (95% CI: 0.72, 5.76).  In 
general, this is because responses in the Disgust Testimony condition remained relatively 
constant across the 12 trials, while responses in the Induced Disgust and Control 
conditions became elevated with additional trials, perhaps due to a regression to the mean 
(see Fig. 3).   
 
  
 
Fig. 3.  Percentage of items judged as “wrong” in each condition in Studies 2 and 3, 
separated by trial to show order effects.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Overall, there was a positive but non-significant correlation between Trait Disgust 
and wrongness judgments, r(88) = .158, p = .137.  This correlation was close to 0 in both 
the Control condition, r(28) = -.025, p = .896, and the Induced Disgust Condition, r(28) = 
.028, p = .882.  However, there was a significant positive correlation between Trait 
Disgust and wrongness judgments in the Disgust Testimony Condition, r(28) = .399, p = 
.029.  It is important to note, however, that the significant correlation in the Disgust 
Testimony condition was driven almost entirely by a single item (“If your friend gave you a 
piece of chocolate and it was shaped like dog doo, would you eat it?”), r(28) = .466, p = .009. 
 
 
Discussion 
 This study demonstrated that testimony about disgust can have a powerful 
moralizing effect for victimless actions, and that this seems to be primarily true for 
individuals who are particularly prone to feeling disgusted.  Although emotion-laden 
testimony was found to significantly increase the moralization of novel victimless 
actions, the moralizing effect of induced disgust was weaker and non-significant.  Thus, 
the increased proportion of “wrongness” judgments in the Disgust Only condition from 
Study 1 was not straightforwardly due to amplified “feelings,” as the effect was 
apparently driven primarily by the testimony about disgust rather than by the presence of 
the gag spray. 
If emotions could be boiled down to mere feelings, this result might be interpreted 
as providing weak evidence for a causal role of emotion in moral judgment.  However, 
the finding that testimony about disgust was only effective for children who were highly 
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prone to disgust suggests that there may in fact be a strong causal role played by 
emotions in moral judgment – but that this occurs more fundamentally at a trait, rather 
than state, level.  In particular, effective moralization may involve a combination of 
enduring emotional tendencies with transient, conceptual information about specific 
actions.  
Nevertheless, this study leaves open an important question: Exactly why do 
individual differences in emotion sensitivity correlate with moral acquisition?  There are 
several non-exclusive explanations of these findings.  First, it is possible that children 
who are highly disgust sensitive are particularly likely to actually experience disgust in 
the wake of hearing that a novel action is disgusting.  Indeed, some evidence suggests 
that people who are highly disgust sensitive are also more readily conditioned to 
experience disgust toward neutral stimuli (David & Olatunji, 2011).  Second, it is 
possible that children who are highly disgust sensitive are better able to abstractly 
entertain the possibility that novel actions are actually disgusting upon being told this 
information.  In other words, these participants may have had a lower threshold for 
considering an action gross and therefore were more credible when hearing the testimony 
that they were provided.  Third, the relationships between these variables could be 
spurious; disgust sensitivity might be a reliable proxy of other personality traits (e.g., 
openness, neuroticism, and/or agreeableness), which in turn influence receptivity to 
certain kinds of moral beliefs (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010).  Of course, other 
interpretations are possible as well, and future research will be needed to indicate which 
is most accurate. 
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The effectiveness of testimony about disgust that was demonstrated in this study 
raises further questions about what would result from other forms of testimony.  
According to the “CAD” (Contempt/Community, Anger/Autonomy, Disgust/Divinity) 
hypothesis of moral emotions (Rozin et al., 1999), disgust is selectively linked to 
harmless taboo violations (often interpreted as being immoral due to their sullying impact 
on an entity’s sacred nature or inherent purity) while anger is selectively linked to moral 
violations involving harm and unfairness.  Therefore, testimony about disgust should be 
particularly powerful for the victimless violations used in the present research, as they 
pose no threats to others’ welfare (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Prinz, 2007).  
Recently, evidence in support of the CAD hypothesis has accumulated, 
demonstrating that disgust is particularly relevant for moral violations involving self-
directed violations of bodily norms leading to physical or spiritual impurities, while anger 
is more reliably linked to other-directed violations of welfare (Chakroff et al., 2013; 
Giner-Sorolla, Bosson, Caswell, & Hettinger, 2012; Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; 
Horberg et al., 2009; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013; Russell, Piazza, & Giner-Sorolla, 
2013; Seidel & Prinz, 2013; Young & Saxe, 2011).  Evidence for the specificity of moral 
disgust has been found for actions involving physical disgust elicitors such as touching a 
corpse (Rozin et al., 1999) as well as for moral purity violations that lack these elements 
of bodily contamination, such as committing suicide (Rottman, Kelemen, & Young, 
2014) and holding divergent religious beliefs (Ritter & Preston, 2011).  Additionally, one 
study has found that elevated levels of trait disgust (but not trait anger) are directly 
related to greater condemnation of moral purity violations, as well as more praise of 
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purity virtues, but are unrelated to moral judgments of violations or virtues involving 
justice (Horberg et al., 2009). 
In contrast, others have posited that there are no specific relationships between 
discrete emotions and particular moral domains (see Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, in 
press).  In support of this domain-general hypothesis, evidence suggests a relationship 
between disgust and moral judgment that extends beyond the purity domain to issues of 
harm and injustice (e.g., Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Eskine et al., 2011; Schnall et 
al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).  For example, disgust has been linked to judgments 
of unfairness in economic games (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; Moretti 
& di Pellegrino, 2010).  According to the results of this body of research, disgust is not 
specifically linked to purity violations, but is rather more generally related to a range of 
norm violations (e.g., Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Tybur, 
Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009).  As a withdrawal emotion, disgust may decrease 
judgments of moral permissibility across the moral domain (Ugazio et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, heightened disgust sensitivity could have a more domain-general impact on 
moral acquisition because individuals who are more prone to experience disgust have a 
generally elevated tendency for detecting signs of moral deviancy.  In particular, elevated 
trait disgust (but not elevated trait anger) is correlated with a lower threshold for 
believing that accused criminals are culpable and evil (Jones & Fitness, 2008).  In 
addition, individuals with high disgust sensitivity are more likely to morally condemn a 
range of normative transgressions outside the purity domain and to view minor 
“conventional” transgressions (e.g., failing to follow a school’s dress code) as being 
  
33 
wrong regardless of what an authority figure says, thus treating these violations as more 
prototypically “moral” (Chapman & Anderson, 2014). 
It is also possible that other condemnatory emotions such as anger may be 
efficacious in elevating moral judgments even within the domain of harmless, purity-
based transgressions, a hypothesis that will be investigated in the present study.  Indeed, 
moral disgust is often associated with moral anger (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013; 
Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006), and some research suggests that purity-
based transgressions that are stripped of physical disgust elicitors such as putrid meat or 
bodily fluids (e.g., using a crucifix as a doorstop) tend to elicit the emotion of anger but 
not the emotion of disgust (Royzman, Atanasov, Landy, Parks, & Gepty, 2014).  
Additionally, some have even found evidence that any kind of highly arousing affective 
response – including disgust, fear, grief, and even positive excitement – can exert a 
similar impact on moral condemnation (Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013).  According to 
these studies, it is possible that other forms of emotional testimony may impact children’s 
moral acquisition to the same extent, or perhaps even a greater extent, than testimony 
about the actions being disgusting and gross. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MORALIZATION BASED ON TESTIMONY ABOUT ANGER (STUDY 3) 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
In order to examine the degree to which disgust is uniquely linked to the 
moralization of victimless actions, Study 3 tested the effectiveness of testimony about anger 
and compared these results to the effectiveness of the disgust testimony found in Study 2. 
 
Participants 
Study 3 enrolled 30 participants (15 of each gender; Mage = 7 years, 4.4 months, 
SD = 3.2 months) who were recruited as in Study 1. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested using the procedure described in Study 1.  In the Anger 
Testimony condition, participants heard the following description before judging the 
behavior as either “wrong” or “OK” (words in brackets are specific to one trial): “Look at 
this! All [Kulvaws] [paint their faces white]. But it’s really angering for [Kulvaws] to 
[paint their faces white]. Acting like this is really irritating.”  Although the term 
“angering” is substantially less frequent than other lexical forms of this word, presumably 
because this emotion often refers to the abstract state of an experiencing subject rather 
than a quality of an action or object (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013), it was employed in 
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order to closely parallel the testimony from Study 2.  Informal questioning of participants 
after the conclusion of the study confirmed that they understood the testimony. 
The Trait Disgust measure used in Study 2 was again administered after the 
presentation of all 12 behaviors in order to compare the present results to those from the 
previous study.  Following this, individual differences in proneness to anger were also 
measured by administering a four-item Trait Anger measure.  This involved Likert-scale 
ratings of four items (see Table 2) selected from a longer 22-item measure (Spielberger, 
Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983).  Finally, participants were once again asked to justify 
their judgments of the twelve alien behaviors at the conclusion of the study session in 
order to tap their explicit reasoning about why they were judging certain actions as wrong 
or permissible. 
 
Table 2.  Trait anger measure.  Items were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from “not at all” to “yes, definitely”. 
 
When you get mad, do you say nasty things? 
When you get frustrated, do you feel like hitting someone? 
Do you have a bad temper that makes you get angry easily? 
Do you get angry when somebody tells you that you’re doing something wrong? 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
As displayed in Fig. 4, the overall average number of wrongness judgments was 
4.67 out of 12 (SD = 3.02).  Data were combined with those from Study 2, and a one-way 
ANOVA was performed to test the effect of Condition on participants’ wrongness 
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judgments.  This analysis now reached significance, F(3, 116) = 2.75, p = .046, η2p = 
.066.  Planned t-tests demonstrated that the Anger Testimony condition was significantly 
different from the Control condition, t(50.49) = 2.87, p = .006, d = 0.75 (95% CI: 0.57, 
3.23), but not from the Disgust Testimony condition, t(58) = 0.16, p = .874, d = 0.04 
(95% CI: -1.55, 1.82), or the Induced Disgust condition, t(58) = 1.15, p = .255, d = 0.30 
(95% CI: -0.64, 2.37).   
 
 
        
Fig. 4.  Percentage of items judged as “wrong” in each condition in Studies 2 and 3.  
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was additionally conducted on participants’ first wrongness 
judgment, to control for potential order effects (see Fig. 5).  As in Study 2, this was 
significant, F(3, 116) = 9.31, p < .001, η2p = .194.  Planned t-tests demonstrated that the 
Anger Testimony condition was significantly different from the Induced Disgust 
condition, t(47.48) = 3.69, p = .001, d = 0.95 (95% CI: 2.18, 7.42), and the Control 
condition, t(36.35) = 4.73, p < .001, d = 1.23 (95% CI: 3.20, 8.00), but did not 
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significantly differ from the Disgust Testimony condition, t(58) = 1.03, p = .305, d = 0.26 
(95% CI: -1.50, 4.69).   
 
 
Fig. 5.  Percentage of items judged as “wrong” in each condition in Studies 2 and 3, 
separated by trial to show order effects.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
As in Study 2, a Trait Disgust score was computed by averaging the responses to 
the four administered items, reverse scoring where appropriate such that higher scores 
indicated higher disgust sensitivity (minimum score = 4; maximum score = 20).  Overall, 
the mean was 15.13 (SD = 3.01).  This scale again demonstrated low internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .47).  A Trait Anger score was also calculated by averaging the 
responses to the four administered items, such that higher scores indicated more 
pronounced tendencies to be angered (minimum score = 4; maximum score = 20).  
Overall, the mean was 9.77 (SD = 3.99), and there was a higher but still questionable 
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level of internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .67), in contrast to the high (> .80) 
Cronbach’s Alphas previously found for the full scale with adults (Spielberger et al., 
1983). 
For the participants in Study 2 (i.e., in the Anger Testimony condition), there was 
a positive but non-significant correlation between Trait Disgust and wrongness 
judgments, r(28) = .247, p = .187.  Additionally, there were no significant relationships 
between wrongness ratings and any single item in the Trait Disgust measure.  However, 
there was a significant positive correlation between Trait Anger and wrongness 
judgments, r(28) = .391, p = .033.  This significant correlation was driven almost entirely 
by a single item (“When you get mad, do you say nasty things?”), r(28) = .537, p = .002.  
There was no relationship detected between levels of Trait Disgust and levels of Trait 
Anger, r(28) = -.066, p = .728. 
Finally, justifications from Studies 2 and 3 were combined and coded for their 
content.  In particular, justifications for all judgments of wrongness (N = 473) were coded 
for the presence or absence of content involving appeals to disgust or anger.  There was 
high agreement between two independent coders (Kappa = .91), and all disagreements 
were resolved through discussion.  Overall, participants rarely appealed to the emotional 
testimony that they were provided.  A mere 5.9% of justifications in the Disgust 
Testimony condition (2.1% of all justifications) appealed to the behavior as being 
disgusting or gross, and only 8.6% of justifications in the Anger Testimony condition 
(2.5% of all justifications) appealed to the behavior as being angering or irritating. 
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Because participants rarely appealed to the emotional testimony that they were 
provided, all justifications were coded a second time (by the same coders as before) to 
determine the general pattern of responses that participants typically gave when judging a 
given behavior to be wrong.  Initial examinations of the data led to the selection of five 
predefined categories that appeared representative.  There was high agreement between 
two independent coders (Kappa = .81), and all disagreements were resolved through 
discussion.  Overall, a large proportion of justifications referred to considerations of harm 
or injustice.  In total, 24.2% of justifications were coded as “causing harm to others,” 
25.3% were coded as “causing unfairness or obstruction,” 15.8% were coded as “causing 
harm to the self,” 24.0% were coded as “being unnatural or unnecessary,” and 10.7% 
were coded as “other/uncodable.”  There was no difference in the distribution of these 
codes across Conditions, as confirmed by an independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis Test, p 
= .858 (see Fig. 6). 
 
  
Fig. 6.  Percentage of justifications coded into each of the five predefined categories, split 
by Condition.  
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Discussion 
The main effect found in Study 3 demonstrates that, at the group level, testimony 
about anger is equally as effective as testimony about disgust in the moralization of 
victimless actions.  This seems to lend support to critics of the “CAD” theory who 
suggest that disgust does not have a privileged, domain-specific relationship with 
victimless actions (e.g., Cameron et al., in press; Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Royzman 
et al., 2014).  However, a comparison of these self-directed behaviors with other-directed 
behaviors would be necessary for a strong conclusion to be drawn.  Additionally, 
although testimony about disgust and testimony about anger both produced comparable 
mean changes in moral acquisition, it appears that there are individual differences in the 
efficacy of these different forms of testimony.  In particular, children who were highly 
disgust sensitive were particularly likely to acquire new moral beliefs upon hearing that 
actions were disgusting and gross, whereas children who were highly prone to anger were 
particularly likely to acquire new moral beliefs upon hearing that actions were angering 
and irritating.  Because these two measures of trait emotion were orthogonal, it appears 
that these groups of children are largely non-overlapping.  Therefore, it seems that 
particular emotional appeals will be differentially effective for different individuals.  
If this finding is borne out by future research, this carries major implications.  In 
particular, it suggests that certain (presumably heritable) dispositions may incline 
different people to learn different kinds of moral norms, which may predispose certain 
children to adopt a predictable pattern of moral beliefs by adulthood.  This could help to 
explain why particular temperaments in early childhood reliably predict political ideology 
  
41 
in adulthood (Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, & Roisman, 2013).  For example, conservative 
ideologies (including a resistance to practices that are considered disgusting, such as gay 
marriage) could stem from a combination of being raised in social environments where 
one is more likely to hear that these actions are disgusting and having a biological 
proneness to internalize this testimony. 
Furthermore, learning that an action is immoral because it is disgusting (as 
opposed to angering) may have other downstream consequences that were not measured 
in this study.  Disgust exerts a more “inflexible” and enduring effect on moral judgments 
than anger, such that it is relatively unaffected by mitigating factors (Piazza, Russell, & 
Sousa, 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011b) such as intent (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 
2011a; Young & Saxe, 2011).  Disgust is additionally associated with heightened beliefs 
about intransigent dispositional factors (Chakroff & Young, 2015), and it is tied to 
dehumanization and extreme forms of prejudice and stigmatization (Bloom, 2013; Harris 
& Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Pizarro, Detweiler-Bedell, & Bloom, 2006; Sherman & 
Haidt, 2011).  Perhaps because of these factors, people report that it is more undesirable 
to be the recipient of disgust than to be a recipient of other moral emotions (Hutcherson 
& Gross, 2011).  Therefore, it is possible that children in the Disgust Testimony 
condition would continue to make a similar pattern of moral judgments even if they were 
told that the actions were performed accidentally, whereas this would not be expected to 
be the case for children in the Anger Testimony condition.  Hearing testimony about 
disgust may also lead children to deem the individuals performing the actions to be more 
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evil (Brandt & Reyna, 2011), animalistic (Haslam, 2006), and contaminating (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986).  
Of course, not all morally relevant testimony that children hear is emotion-laden.  
The final study in this dissertation examines the effects of other forms of testimony.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RETENTION OF NEWLY ACQUIRED MORAL BELIEFS (STUDY 4) 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The results of Studies 2 and 3 have demonstrated that testimony can powerfully 
influence moral acquisition.  Crucially, children were never directly told that the actions 
being evaluated were wrong, but instead made these judgments based on testimony that 
was morally relevant.  On one interpretation of the evidence, children were not especially 
discerning in their utilization of testimony.  In particular, there were no differences in 
how readily moral testimony was applied to different kinds of actions (i.e., body-directed 
vs. environment-directed), and there were no mean differences in how readily children 
learned from different types of moral testimony (i.e., about unnaturalness, disgust, and 
anger).  However, children’s moral judgments were not elevated upon hearing that the 
actions were boring in Study 1.  Taken together, this evidence could be interpreted as 
indicating that children have a simple tendency to judge actions as slightly more immoral 
upon hearing any kind of information that is both negatively valenced and morally 
relevant.  Alternatively, rather than amplifying moral judgments to the same extent 
regardless of what morally relevant testimony is provided, it is possible that more 
nuanced distinctions might be found for other types of morally relevant testimony (e.g., 
about harm or injustice).  Testing this possibility was a primary aim of Study 4. 
This study additionally explored whether children would retain moral judgments 
after a delay and in the presence of a novel adult.  In disparate other domains in which 
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fast mapping occurs (e.g., language acquisition, artifact knowledge, arbitrary actions), 
conventional knowledge has been found to persist across an extended period of time 
and/or across different experimental contexts (e.g., Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Casler & 
Kelemen, 2005; Király, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013).  This kind of long-term retention has 
also been found in other domains of learning, such as for biology understanding 
(Kelemen, Emmons, Schillaci, & Ganea, 2014).  In order to explore the enduring nature 
of the moral acquisition in this study, participants were asked to return for a follow-up 
session after a prolonged delay. 
 
Participants 
Study 4 enrolled 30 participants (15 of each gender; Mage = 7 years, 4.2 months, 
SD = 3.2 months) who were recruited as in Study 1. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested using the procedure described in Study 1.  However, 
rather than hearing the same piece of testimony for 12 scenarios in a row, as was the case 
in the previous studies, participants in Study 4 were presented with a randomized mixture 
of four types of testimony (dealing with harm to others, unfairness/obstruction, harm to 
the self, and weirdness/unnaturalness), which were repeated for three scenarios each (for 
a total of 12 scenarios, as in the previous studies).  Half of the scenarios were paired with 
a “well-fitting” form of testimony that reflected the modal justification type for that 
scenario across the 473 wrongness judgments provided by the 120 participants in Studies 
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2 and 3.  The other half of scenarios were paired with a “poor-fitting” form of testimony 
that reflected an uncommon or unused justification type for that scenario across the 120 
participants in Studies 2 and 3.  This was counterbalanced, such that in one set of stimuli, 
six items were paired with “well-fitting” forms of testimony and six items were paired 
with “poor-fitting” forms of testimony, and the fit of the testimony used for these items 
was reversed in a second set of stimuli.  Half (3/6) of the body-directed actions, and half 
(3/6) of the environment-directed actions were paired with consistent forms of testimony, 
and half (2/4) of the actions of each alien were paired with consistent forms of testimony, 
such that the four behaviors performed by each of the three alien groups had the 
following forms of testimony: one body-directed action with consistent testimony, one 
environment-directed action with consistent testimony, one body-directed action with 
inconsistent testimony, and one environment-directed action with inconsistent testimony.  
This resulted in 1 or 2 consistent and 1 or 2 inconsistent forms of each testimony type 
(counterbalanced across each stimulus set), as shown in Table 3.  Each set of stimuli was 
administered to a total of 15 participants.  
Participants were asked to return for a second visit approximately three months 
after the first visit (Mdelay = 97.6 days; mindelay = 55 days, maxdelay = 175 days).  At this 
follow-up visit, a novel experimenter asked participants to judge the twelve behaviors as 
wrong or OK without providing any testimony (such that the protocol exactly matched 
that of the Control condition from Study 2).  Two participants from the original sample of 
30 did not return for a second visit and were excluded from analyses.  
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Table 3.  Stimuli for Study 4.  “Poor-fitting” testimony is italicized. 
 
 Set 1 (15 participants) Set 2 (15 participants) 
Harm to 
Others 
It really hurts others when Bonzers fill the 
forest with cotton balls. Acting like this is 
harmful to other things. 
It really hurts others when Bonzers build 
machines to make the air more misty. Acting 
like this is harmful to other things. 
Harm to 
Others 
It really hurts others when Kulvaws 
sprinkle blue water into the big puddle. 
Acting like this is harmful to other things. 
It really hurts others when Kulvaws paint 
their faces white. Acting like this is harmful 
to other things. 
Harm to 
Others 
It really hurts others when Quimples drink 
out of straws instead of using their spoon 
hands. Acting like this is harmful to other 
things. 
It really hurts others when Bonzers keep 
berries on their protective spikes. Acting like 
this is harmful to other things. 
Unfairness/ 
Obstruction 
It’s really unfair for Quimples to block the 
river to make it flow in a different 
direction. Acting like this prevents others 
from getting what they need. 
It’s really unfair for Quimples to pour river 
water on the flowers to make them big and 
square. Acting like this prevents others from 
getting what they need. 
Unfairness/ 
Obstruction 
It’s really unfair for Kulvaws to walk 
around with fake legs. Acting like this 
prevents others from getting what they 
need. 
It’s really unfair for Kulvaws to take trees 
from other planets and plant them on 
Glinhondo. Acting like this prevents others 
from getting what they need. 
Unfairness/ 
Obstruction 
It’s really unfair for Bonzers to cover their 
heads with sticks. Acting like this prevents 
others from getting what they need. 
It’s really unfair for Quimples to put crunchy 
bits in their food. Acting like this prevents 
others from getting what they need. 
Harm to 
Self 
Quimples really hurt themselves when 
they put crunchy bits in their food. Acting 
like this is harmful to them. 
Bonzers really hurt themselves when they 
cover their heads with sticks. Acting like this 
is harmful to them. 
Harm to 
Self 
Bonzers really hurt themselves when they 
keep berries on their protective spikes. 
Acting like this is harmful to them. 
Quimples really hurt themselves when they 
block the river to make it flow in a different 
direction. Acting like this is harmful to them. 
Harm to 
Self 
Quimples really hurt themselves when they 
pour river water on the flowers to make 
them big and square. Acting like this is 
harmful to them. 
Kulvaws really hurt themselves when they 
sprinkle blue water into the big puddle. 
Acting like this is harmful to them. 
Weird/ 
Unnatural 
It’s really weird for Kulvaws to paint their 
faces white. Acting like this goes against 
how things are supposed to be. 
It’s really weird for Kulvaws to walk around 
with fake legs. Acting like this goes against 
how things are supposed to be.  
Weird/ 
Unnatural 
It’s really weird for Kulvaws to take trees 
from other planets and plant them on 
Glinhondo. Acting like this goes against 
how things are supposed to be. 
It’s really weird for Quimples to drink out of 
straws instead of using their spoon hands. 
Acting like this goes against how things are 
supposed to be. 
Weird/ 
Unnatural 
It’s really weird for Bonzers to build 
machines to make the air more misty. 
Acting like this goes against how things 
are supposed to be. 
It’s really weird for Bonzers to fill the forest 
with cotton balls. Acting like this goes 
against how things are supposed to be. 
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Results 
Overall, the average number of wrongness judgments at T1 was 7.04 out of 12 
(SD = 2.95).  With the exception of the Disgust + Unnatural condition in Study 1, this 
mean is considerably higher than what was yielded by previous conditions.  This suggests 
that morally relevant principles (e.g., harmfulness, unfairness) are highly effective forms 
of moral testimony.  At T2, the average number of wrongness judgments was 4.36 out of 
12 (SD = 2.98). 
In order to measure the effect of the time delay, children’s “wrongness” 
judgments at T1 (when they were presented with testimony) were compared to their 
judgments at T2 (when no testimony was provided).  Overall, there was a substantial 
decrease from T1 to T2 in the percent of items judged as “wrong”, t(27) = 4.58, p < .001, 
d = 0.87 (95% CI: 1.48, 3.88).  This indicates that the moral judgments that children 
formed at T1 were not highly preserved across the time delay.  Despite this, there 
remained a significant correlation in “wrongness” judgments between T1 and T2, r(26) = 
.46, p = .014.  Of the 336 items that were judged as “wrong” or “OK” across the 28 
usable participants, 66.4% of later judgments remained consistent with the original 
judgments (see Fig. 7).   
To determine whether any long-term internalization of the T1 testimony occurred, 
children’s judgments at T2 were compared to the judgments of the children in the Control 
condition from Study 2.  Because these sessions involved identical protocols, they should 
yield equivalent judgments if the testimony provided at T1 was merely priming children’s 
judgments in the moment rather than leading to any enduring beliefs.  However, results 
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demonstrated that children’s “wrongness” judgments at T2 were significantly elevated 
above Control participants’ wrongness judgments, t(46.9) = 2.36, p = .022, d = 0.63 (95% 
CI: 0.24, 2.94).  Despite the large range of time elapsing for individual participants 
between testing sessions, there was no significant correlation between the length of delay 
between T1 and T2 and the change in wrongness judgments between T1 and T2, r(26) = 
.21, p = .280.  These results demonstrate that, although the items were deemed 
substantially more permissible at T2 than at T1, there was some degree of enduring 
learning that occurred, such that children continued to judge the items as more wrong 
after a considerable delay. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Changes from Time 1 to Time 2 in Study 4.  Red indicates change over time; blue 
indicates consistency over time. 
 
 
 
To examine which specific types of testimony were most effective and promoted 
the longest retention, a 4 (Testimony Type: HarmOthers, Unfairness, HarmSelf, 
Weirdness) X 2 (Time: T1, T2) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted (see Fig. 8).  
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A main effect of Time, F(1, 27) = 21.02, p < .001, η2p = .438, and a marginal effect of 
Testimony Type, F(3, 81) = 2.41, p = .073, η2p = .082, were found, in addition to a 
significant Testimony Type by Time interaction, F(3, 81) = 6.44, p = .001, η2p = .193.  
This pattern of results occurred because, while moral condemnation was generally high at 
T1 and declined substantially over the 3-month delay, testimony about “weirdness” was 
the least likely to lead to initial moralization and also the least likely to lose its influence 
over time.  The interaction effect is further illuminated by the findings that: (a) in the 
Study 2 Control condition, “wrong” ratings for the subset of items used in the Weirdness 
condition were higher than “wrong” ratings for the subset of items used in the 
HarmOthers and HarmSelf conditions (uncorrected ps < .01); (b) at T1, “wrong” ratings 
for Weirdness items were lower than “wrong” ratings for HarmOthers, Unfairness, and 
HarmSelf items (uncorrected ps < .06); and (c) “wrong” ratings for Weirdness items were 
not significantly above Control levels at either T1 (p = .089) or T2 (p = .225). 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Percentage of items judged as “wrong” in each condition in Study 4.  Means from 
the Study 2 Control condition are included for reference.  Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
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In order to determine whether the well-fitting testimony was more likely to be 
accepted by the children than the poor-fitting testimony, a 2 (Testimony Fit: Consistent, 
Inconsistent) X 2 (Time: T1, T2) repeated-measures ANOVA was also conducted.  This 
analysis yielded no effect of Testimony Fit, F(1, 27) = 0.01, p = .946, η2p = .000, and no 
interaction between Fit and Time, F(1, 27) = 0.39, p = .538, η2p = .014 (see Fig. 9).  The 
total lack of any effect suggests that children did not attend to the rationality, or “fit,” of 
the testimony they were provided, contrary to reason-based models of moral acquisition. 
        
 
Fig. 9.  Percentage of items judged as “wrong” in each condition in Study 4.  The mean 
from the Study 2 Control condition is included for reference.  Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Many scholars of moral development have suggested that children are 
sophisticated in their utilization of testimony.  For example, they are thought to shrewdly 
interpret and evaluate testimony in the process of actively reasoning their way to an 
ultimate rational judgment, such that they will judiciously reject testimony that they 
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consider to be irrelevant or inappropriate (Grusec, Chaparro, Johnston, & Sherman, 2014; 
Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Nucci, 1984; Smetana, 1999).  This suggests that children 
should learn from testimony that fits well with the kind of action being described, and not 
from testimony that fits poorly with the particular situation.  However, the present study 
found no difference between the effectiveness of well-fitting and poor-fitting testimony. 
Instead, this study tentatively suggests that the processing of testimony is less active 
and more unconscious than most theories propose.  Rather, certain concepts (e.g., 
harmfulness and unfairness – but potentially not weirdness) generate rapid and robust 
moral acquisition, regardless of how sensible the particular form of testimony seems to 
be.  Indeed, humans likely possess a range of evolved biases that place constraints on the 
kinds of information that can lead to moral judgment (Giroux, 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 
2004, 2007; Rottman & Young, 2015), and certain forms of testimony may reflexively 
trigger these innate dispositions, bypassing a careful reasoning process. 
Finally, this study has demonstrated that the moral beliefs that children acquire in 
this paradigm are at least somewhat robust and resilient, as they persist (to some degree) 
for many months and in the presence of a novel adult.  
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Contrary to the widespread belief that “internalization [of moral values] is not 
likely to be reached in a single bound” (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994, p. 13), this research 
has demonstrated that children can rapidly acquire new moral beliefs from a very brief 
intervention.  Study 1 found that both information about unnaturalness and a disgust 
manipulation (involving testimony about disgust paired with induced disgust) elevated 
seven-year-olds’ judgments of moral wrongness, and this was especially powerful when 
the two manipulations were combined.  Study 2 showed that the disgust manipulation in 
this first study was primarily driven by testimony about disgust, which was particularly 
effective for children with greater tendencies to experience disgust toward “core” 
elicitors such as cockroaches.  Study 3 indicated that testimony about anger is equally as 
powerful as testimony about disgust, but that it is particularly effective for children with 
greater tendencies to experience anger in their everyday lives.  Study 4 found evidence 
for the effectiveness of other forms of testimony, and additionally provided suggestive 
evidence that these studies were in fact studying chronic moral acquisition, rather than 
merely a temporary moral construal (e.g., Van Bavel, Packer, Haas, & Cunningham, 
2012), as the results showed that moral beliefs persisted to some extent over a period of 
three months. 
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The Implications for Proposed Links Between Emotions and Morality 
 Across the four studies examined here, what is the evidence that emotion plays an 
important role in moral acquisition?  First, what conclusions are to be derived from the 
results of the Induced Disgust condition in Study 2, for which the proportion of 
“wrongness” judgments did not differ from those in either the Control condition or the 
Disgust Testimony condition?    
One consideration is that, according to affect-as-information theories, it is crucial 
for participants to misattribute their emotional experiences to the actions being evaluated 
in order for an irrelevant feeling to impact their judgment, particularly when they are 
induced to feel negative affect (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  Perhaps, then, participants in 
the Induced Disgust condition correctly attributed the foul odor to the box that they 
smelled at the beginning of the study, thus realizing that it was irrelevant to their 
evaluative judgments and making this an unfair test of the role of induced disgust.  
However, participants have been acutely aware of the disgust elicitor in many other 
studies that have reported the effectiveness of incidental disgust on influencing moral 
judgments (e.g., Eskine et al., 2011; Horberg et al., 2009; Seidel & Prinz, 2013; Ugazio et 
al., 2012).  Moreover, there is no strong evidence from other empirical work that accurate 
attribution (or a lack thereof, after a time delay and distraction task) influences the 
effectiveness of disgust induction on moral judgments (Case, Oaten, & Stevenson, 2012), 
and in one case awareness of a disgust elicitor actually decreased the severity of moral 
judgments relative to a control condition (Olatunji & Puncochar, 2015). 
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While additional research is needed to decisively conclude whether a disgust 
manipulation can lead to a small elevation in children’s moral acquisition or no reliable 
elevation at all, it is possible to tentatively conclude from the present findings that 
incidental disgust does not necessarily lead to robust moralization.  This view is 
supported by recent work in philosophy and psychology.  In particular, despite the 
seemingly convergent evidence supporting the power of incidental disgust to influence 
moral condemnation, there has been a great deal of skepticism about this claim.  In part, 
this has been fueled by several recently reported failures to replicate the finding that 
disgust manipulations can elevate moral judgments (e.g., Case et al., 2012; David & 
Olatunji, 2011; Ugazio et al., 2012), and a recent meta-analysis including many 
unpublished results has suggested that any effect of induced disgust on moral judgment is 
vanishingly small across all studies surveyed (Landy & Goodwin, in press).  In addition, 
several papers have highlighted a range of methodological, analytic, and interpretive 
issues with the studies that have purported to find strong evidence of this effect (Case et 
al., 2012; Huebner, in press; May, 2014).  For example, to the extent that disgust (or any 
other emotion) plays a causal role in moral judgments, it is possible that it is only 
indirectly causal rather than constitutive of moral judgments (Huebner, in press).  
Experiencing disgust might simply direct attention to morally relevant features of 
situations, perhaps by enhancing perceptual awareness of impurities (Sherman, Haidt, & 
Clore, 2012), rather than playing a direct role in moralization.  In addition, disgust 
inductions are often only found to amplify moral judgments for a subset of the participant 
sample.  Some studies have found that induced disgust impacts moral beliefs primarily 
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for individuals with high levels of awareness of bodily arousal (Schnall et al., 2008), 
particularly when the emotion induction lacks a strong sensory component (Cheng et al., 
2013).  Others have found that viewing disgusting photos elevates moral judgment only 
for individuals who do not possess marked abilities to differentiate between different 
discrete emotions (Cameron, Payne, & Doris, 2013).  Another study has found that only 
conservative participants’ moral judgments are impacted by the induction of disgust 
(Eskine et al., 2011).  This suggests that any reliable effects may be weak at a group 
level. 
Beyond these complications in the empirical literature, it stands to reason that the 
experience of disgust should not be sufficient for moral acquisition to occur, as there are 
many actions that elicit feelings of revulsion but would be maladaptive to deem immoral 
(e.g., garbage collection).  Furthermore, research has demonstrated that deviant sexual 
actions matched for their disgustingness are judged differently depending on whether 
there is a social norm against their occurrence (Royzman et al., 2009).  Therefore, 
phenomenological experiences may need to be associated with learned norms – or at least 
knowledge that an action is gross – for moral acquisition to reliably occur (Kagan, 1984; 
Nichols, 2004; Rozin, 1999).  Incidental emotions by themselves may be insufficient for 
moralization. 
It may seem tempting to conclude from the null finding in the case of the direct 
disgust induction that the present data do not lend convincing support to the view that 
emotions are relevant to moralization.  However, taken as a whole, these results 
nevertheless support a sentimentalist view of morality.  Particularly if the explanation of 
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the correlation between trait emotion sensitivity and moralization turns out to be that 
participants who were particularly prone to feel disgusted (or angered) actually felt 
disgust (or anger) upon hearing testimony that an action was gross (or irritating), this 
continues to demonstrate that emotions are powerful drivers of moralization.  It merely 
highlights the caveat that emotions must be somehow grounded or, more specifically, 
attributed to the action being judged rather than to an irrelevant external stimulus.  
Indeed, this allows for a more complex role for emotions in moral judgment, as it 
suggests that moral emotions must necessarily be generated by appraisals of 
transgressions rather than existing as mere context-neutral somatic feelings. 
Additionally, according to one of the most prominent accounts of the primacy of 
emotions in moral judgments, a person need not experience an emotion in every instance 
of making a moral judgment for emotions to be necessary and sufficient for moral 
competence (Prinz, 2007).  Rather, Prinz argues that a person must have a sentimental 
disposition to feel a particular moral emotion in similar cases.  If sentimentalism is 
construed in this way – as a trait-based theory rather than a state-based theory – the 
present results can be interpreted as being fully consistent with this theoretical stance.  
Specifically, children who are highly prone to disgust (or anger) seem to have a 
disposition to view a greater number of acts as morally disgusting (or angering) upon 
hearing pertinent testimony.  Therefore, information that novel acts are gross (or 
irritating) may be more likely to resonate with their emotional sensibilities.  Future 
research on the role of emotions in moral judgment may be most successful if it focuses 
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on enduring emotional dispositions (which may be momentarily elicited in relevant 
contexts) rather than transient, context-free emotional states. 
 
Evidence of “Moral Dumbfounding” 
The fact that emotional processing is often automatic has led some to posit that 
people may lack conscious access to the sources of their emotion-laden moral judgments 
(e.g., Haidt, 2001).  Indeed, the justification data from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that 
participants lacked robust introspective awareness of the sources of their moral 
judgments, such that they generated post-hoc constructions when they attempted to 
explain their judgments.  In particular, although exposure to emotion-laden testimony 
constituted the entire underlying reason that the participants in the Disgust Testimony and 
Anger Testimony conditions made significantly more “wrong” judgments than 
participants in the Control and Induced Disgust conditions, only a small number of 
justifications in these conditions appealed to the actions being “disgusting/gross” or 
“angering/irritating” in explaining their judgments of wrongness.  Instead, participants 
tended to appeal to facts and principles that were orthogonal to the information they were 
provided.  This tentatively suggests that the study manipulations influenced participants’ 
moral evaluations in ways that they did not realize, which then produced “moral 
dumbfounding” and post-hoc rationalization (Dwyer, 2009; Haidt, 2001; also see Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977).  This pattern of findings, in which the underlying bases of moral 
judgments are not always accurately reflected in explicit moral beliefs, has been 
repeatedly found in studies with adults (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Haidt & 
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Hersh, 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Rottman et al., 2014), for 
whom condemnations of harmless offenses are particularly difficult to justify (Uhlmann 
& Zhu, 2014).  However, the current research represents the first demonstration of a 
dissociation between moral judgments and moral justifications in children.  Because 
participants would be expected to maintain some degree of reflective access to the 
sources of their moral judgments if they had arrived at these conclusions through explicit 
reasoning, these findings suggest that moral judgments may be driven by intuitive 
processes even at the time they are initially formed, rather than gradually becoming 
automatized through years of practice (cf. Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004). 
This interpretation of the evidence contrasts with traditional accounts of moral 
development, which predict that, to the extent that children utilize testimony as an input 
to their moral evaluations, it should be used as a basis for consciously reasoning their 
way to their moral judgments (Smetana, 1999).  The response from a more traditional 
position might be, however, that the dissociation presently observed between 
justifications and judgments does not necessarily demonstrate moral dumbfounding.  
Instead, it could be argued that the testimony provided in Studies 2 and 3 catalyzed a 
reasoning process that went beyond the information that was provided, leading 
participants to construct a complex causal chain of events that resulted in judgments of 
immorality.  Indeed, even though the scenarios were all designed to be innocuous, it is 
possible that participants perceived harm in some of the actions upon hearing morally 
relevant testimony, which in turn rendered the actions immoral.  Subjective beliefs and 
inferences about unseen pain and suffering can influence moral evaluations of seemingly 
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innocuous actions, despite no objective evidence of harm to others in the superficial 
characteristics of events (Gray & Wegner, 2012; Gray et al., 2012; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & 
Wainryb, 1991; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Wainryb, 1991).  In studies with adults, 
victims and harmfulness are often automatically and implicitly assumed in objectively 
harmless moral violations, such as consensual sibling incest (Gray et al., 2014; Royzman 
et al., 2009). 
Future research is required to more definitively distinguish these interpretations.  
Nevertheless, the current pattern of results already provides reasons to believe that the 
moral dumbfounding interpretation will be supported.  First, there were no differences in 
the justification patterns provided in different experimental conditions (i.e., harm was not 
invoked to a greater degree in the testimony conditions than in the Control condition, nor 
was there a difference between the Disgust Testimony and the Anger Testimony 
conditions).  This is unexpected under accounts that suggest participants actually 
perceived more harm after hearing particular forms of testimony.  For example, although 
presumptions of harm often occur in the wake of feelings of anger (Gutierrez & Giner-
Sorolla, 2007), there were no differences in the extent to which harm-based justifications 
were invoked in this condition compared to other conditions. 
Second, there is reason to believe that assessments of harm are often products, 
rather than precursors, of moral judgments.  In many cases, people have been found to 
alter their factual beliefs to support their moral judgments (e.g., Knobe, 2003; Liu & 
Ditto, 2013).  Blame also exerts a strong top-down influence in perceptions of and 
reactions toward distress, such that the amount of pain that is perceived depends on how 
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responsible and stigmatized a victim is thought to be (Decety, Echols, & Correll, 2010).  
For moral violations where actual harm is absent, justifications that appeal to harm 
frequently reflect post-hoc rationalizations in support of an initial moral judgment 
(DeScioli, Gilbert, & Kurzban, 2012; Ditto, Liu, & Wojcik, 2012; Gutierrez & Giner-
Sorolla, 2007).  Thus, while justifications of moral judgments often include appeals to 
harm or victims, actual or imagined harm are not necessarily the true causes of those 
judgments.  Rather than actually believing that more harm occurred upon hearing that 
actions were disgusting or angering, participants’ justifications likely reflect post-hoc 
constructions, generated from a priori folk theories about what is central to moral blame, 
rather than accurately reflecting underlying causal processes of moral reasoning (Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977).   
Finally, the results from Study 4 provided additional support for the conclusion 
that children are not be particularly discerning when learning new moral beliefs from 
adults’ testimony.  In particular, they did not seem to make a distinction between well 
fitting and poorly fitting forms of testimony when acquiring new moral beliefs, 
suggesting that they do not always rely primarily on their reasoning capacities when 
learning moral information. 
 
Relationship of the Present Work to the Moral/Conventional Distinction 
 Throughout this dissertation, “morality” has been defined liberally, as having a 
very broad scope encompassing even victimless actions.  This contrasts with the way that 
morals are typically defined in the cognitive development literature.  For example, the 
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social domain theory of moral development (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) considers an 
action to be morally wrong if and only if it negatively impacts the welfare of others, and 
to be “conventionally” wrong if and only if it violates a social rule.  The novel actions 
considered in the present research do not obviously fit into either of these categories, but 
some might argue that they are more similar to social conventions than morals.  For 
example, some have pointed out that taboos are unlike other morals in that they aren’t 
universally binding, are immune to considerations of intentionality, and that they tend to 
regulate self-directed rather than other-directed actions (Appiah, 2006).  However, some 
of these differences may simply reflect differences in processing distinct kinds of moral 
violations rather than wholly distinctive classes of normative violations (e.g., Young & 
Saxe, 2011). 
Indeed, there are some reasons to believe that the normative convictions 
expressed by participants in the present research are truly “moral” in nature.  First, even 
though children were only asked whether the actions in question were “wrong” (which is 
a potentially ambiguous term), they primarily justified their judgments in morally 
relevant terms (e.g., appealing to others’ harm or welfare).  Second, participants in Study 
1 were asked whether or not the actions should be punished, and the extent to which they 
endorsed punishment was highly correlated with the extent to which they judged the 
actions to be wrong, r(62) = .78, p < .001.  Because moral violations tend to be deemed 
as much more deserving of punishment than conventional violations (Smetana, 1981), 
this suggests that children were construing the wrongness of the items in moral terms.  
Third, with the exception of two conditions in Study 1 (Unnatural Only and Disgust + 
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Unnatural), the behaviors were presented as being practiced by all members of the group.  
Therefore, the aliens were not violating their own social norms by engaging in the 
depicted behaviors. 
If children are indeed viewing the victimless actions in the present study as moral, 
this further suggests that other considerations beyond harm, welfare, and injustice may be 
relevant to moralization.  As other research has demonstrated, there is not always a 
consistent divide between moral and conventional norms (Haidt et al., 1993; Hussar & 
Harris, 2010; Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, & Fessler, 2007; Nisan, 1987; Piazza, Sousa, & 
Holbrook, 2013; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013; Shweder et al., 1987), and many norms that 
social domain theorists classify as “conventional” are often reified and treated as 
objective rather than arbitrary (e.g., Gabennesch, 1990).  Social domain theorists have 
themselves found that certain actions (i.e., taboos such as incest, homosexuality, abortion, 
and pornography use) are non-prototypical issues that seem to blend moral and 
conventional concerns (Turiel et al., 1991).  The items in the present study may be similar 
to these non-prototypical issues. 
 
Future Directions 
The present research has ventured into largely uncharted empirical territory. 
There remain numerous unanswered questions in researching children’s moral 
acquisition, particularly as examining the ontogenetic origins of different moral 
foundations beyond those of harm and fairness has not been a focus in studies of moral 
development (Haidt, 2008; Maxwell & Narvaez, 2013) or in mainstream approaches to 
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moral education (Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman, 2008).  There is therefore a great 
deal of room for future work to investigate the relevance of different forms of testimony 
for acquiring a variety of different moral beliefs. 
Future research should additionally examine whether certain informants are more 
effective purveyors of moral information, such that children will readily accept moral 
testimony from some people over others rather than indiscriminately trusting all sources 
of moral information.  In epistemic domains, children have been shown to discerningly 
trust informants who are more knowledgeable or competent (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 
2008; Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2010, 2011; Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Jaswal & Neely, 
2006; Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Lane, Wellman, & 
Gelman, 2013; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010), prestigious (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 
2012), familiar (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2010), or kind (Doebel & Koenig, 2013; 
Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 2013; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), and they often constrain 
their trust in experts to a delimited range of expertise (Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2011; 
Danovitch & Keil, 2004).  However, no studies have directly examined the dispositional 
traits that entail greater credence in the moral domain.   
Additionally, cultural transmission extends beyond the provision of linguistic 
information, and future research should examine other routes by which adults might 
convey moral beliefs to children.  For example, because a disgusted facial expression in 
conjunction with vocalizations of repulsion (e.g., “yuck”; “argh”) appears to be the most 
effective means for socializing children’s disgust toward non-moral disgust elicitors, such 
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as fecal smells and dirty socks (Oaten, Stevenson, Wagland, Case, & Repacholi, 2014), 
this may prove to be an effective source of moral knowledge as well. 
Finally, it is important for future research to investigate developmental 
differences in the effectiveness of the different experimental manipulations examined 
here.  Because only seven-year-olds were studied in the present research, both younger 
and older children should be recruited in future studies in order to determine the 
trajectory according to which different forms of testimony are most effective in leading to 
moral acquisition.  The role of individual differences should additionally be pursued 
further in order to better understand variability in children’s tendencies to learn moral 
beliefs from others. 
 
Conclusion 
Moral beliefs have undergone many dramatic changes throughout human history, 
and future generations will undoubtedly bear witness to many more changes for as long 
as the human species continues to exist.  Presently, in the year 2015, numerous moral 
issues demand urgent attention.  Billions of sentient creatures are being brutally 
slaughtered in factory farms, millions of women and girls are being exploited for sex 
trafficking, and anthropogenic climate change is wreaking havoc on the natural world.  
However, many products of these actions – including mouth-watering strips of bacon, 
pornographic videos, and gradual environmental impacts that are primarily being felt by 
poorer nations – do not produce the kinds of visible distress posited by many moral 
developmentalists to be the raw material for constructing moral beliefs to allay these and 
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other concerns.  Additionally, truly victimless actions have recently been cause for moral 
outrage for various communities: a recent proposal to build a gondola tramway in a 
pristine swath of the Grand Canyon is abhorrent to many who value nature for its own 
sake, while rising levels of apostasy have fueled the enmity of the Islamic State (ISIS).  If 
one desires to foster a culture in which people condemn some acts despite a lack of 
apparent negative consequences but reject moralization of other victimless but “impure” 
acts, it will be informative to understand how moral values are culturally transmitted and 
acquired during childhood.  Given that this research has demonstrated how readily 
children adopt new moral beliefs when provided with a broad range of testimony about 
seemingly victimless actions, adults’ conversations with younger generations may indeed 
be a crucial element in effectively facilitating positive moral change. 
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APPENDIX 
 
EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI 
 
Body-directed behaviors:  
 
            
    Keeping berries on their protective spines                          Painting their faces white 
 
            
   Drinking from straws instead of spoon hands                 Covering their heads with sticks 
 
            
              Walking around with fake legs                              Putting crunchy bits in their food 
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Environment-directed behaviors: 
 
            
      Sprinkling blue water into the big puddle                    Filling the forest with cotton balls 
 
            
     Building machines to make the air mistier         Watering flowers to make them big and square 
 
            
       Blocking the river so it flows elsewhere                     Replanting trees from other planets 
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